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Inherent Instability: Disproving
Luttwak's Thesis of Defense
in Depth
BY ADAM STILGOE

Adam is an English and History major who

...- . -.. his paper is chiefly designed to illustrate the fourth century

produced this piece for a History Colloquim

Roman defense in depth model of border protection with regard

his Senior year for Professor Ierardi. His

to the Eastern part of the Roman empire. While several models

enjoyment in writing this piece was drawn

of defense in depth with regard to the Roman Empire exist, I have

from the primary source documentation

chosen to utilize Edward Luttwak's book The Grand Strategy ofthe Roman Empire

offered by Ammianus Marcellus.

as representative of Eastern Roman defense in depth during Constantius' and
Julian's reign from 353 to 363 C.E. 1 I have paid particular regard to fortifications
and the use of artillery, as they are most often mentioned in Ammianus
Marcellinus's surviving histories and other primary source documents and are
integral pieces of an effective border defense. The second part of this essay is a
critique of Luttwak's description of Roman border defense through the lens of
primary source documents, as his thesis and the texts of ancient authors differ
in several key points. In particular, Constantine's movement of troops from the
borders to a mobile, standing army is misrepresented in Luttwak's work and
needs to be corrected.
Luttwak's thesis on Roman border defenses offers two examples of standard
Roman practice in the East, and elsewhere. The Western borders are a topic in
their own right that will not be addressed in this paper. There were two kinds
of defense available to the Roman emperors during the latter half of the fourth
century: an elastic defense and a defense in depth.2 An elastic defense had no
fortified perimeter; instead the defense relied on mobile forces, comprised of both
infantry and cavalry that could meet the offense head on, as long as the defense was
at least as mobile as the offense.3 This strategy acquired the benefit of not needing
to assign troops to hold fortifications, and therefore not needing to send troops
stationed at peaceful borders elsewhere in case of a military emergency; conversely,
it sacrificed the inherent advantages ofdefending a fOrtified, fixed position, although
the defense could still defend territory that it knew relatively welL4
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The defense in depth model is slightly more complex.
It is based on

~self

contained strongholds with mobile

forces either between or behind

them,~

whereby the mobile

forces in reserve and the fortifications act in concert.s

that made them distinct from their predecessors. First, forts
began to be built on different sites; rather than attempting to
merely look impressive, forts were constructed less for ease

If

of travel (i.e. near roads) but instead for tactical dominance. ll

the strongholds could successfully withstand the offense

In particular, there was a concern for easily defensible

without requiring assistance of the mobile reserve, if the

terrain; forts were often placed on hills, or near areas that

mobile elements did not need the for£ified areas to survive

were otherwise easily defensible, with rivers being a chief

an encounter with the enemy, and if the invading army

commodity in fort building. 12 Forts also acquired different

needed to destroy the fortified areas to continue, then it was

shapes; instead of the older rectangular shaped forts with

a successful use of the defense in depth military method. 6

a circular ditch defense, forts became irregularly shaped

Not only cities would be fortified; granaries, villas, lowns,

quadrilaterals or ovals, or squared, with the advantage

villages, and defensive positions all acquired fortifications in

becoming that of a shorter distance for soldiers to move

which townsfolk or whatever bands of soldiers were handy

about the top of the wa1l 13• Walls were thickened, as were

could defend themselves; food could also be stored in such

ditches, to keep battering rams and other siege engines away

enclosures and supply lines and roads could be protected

from the walls. It

through the use of this fortification system.? Mention in

Luttwak's

explanation

for

the

sudden

increased

a surviving document pertaining to Constantius' actions

effectiveness of Roman fortifications goes against what he

regarding the supplying of forts and fortified towns in Syria

says is "sometimes suggested~15. He believes that fortifications

~The

cities of Syria you stocked

were not improved because the armies threatening Rome

with engines of war, garrisons, food supplies, and equipment

suddenly developed better siege equipment, but were instead

of other kinds, considering that ...you would ... sufficiently

produced precisely because the armies threatening Rome had

is also made, stating that,

inhabitants.~8

An invading army would find its

not produced such equipment at all. 16 It should be noted that

supply lines cut off by bands of roving soldiers that had taken

his primary interest is in the barbarian armies of the West,

shelter in fortified camps or towns and were now ravaging

and reference is made to the Persian armies having advanced

the army's rear; if the army ceased moving towards the

their siege making technology, although little more is said

interior and attempted to deal with the city it lost valuable

than that they had it. 17

protect the

time, supplies, and men, in turn giving the mobile Roman

Another chief component of the defense of Roman

army time to counterattack as it marched from its position

fortifications is that of artillery. Artillery was no longer part

somewhere along the Mediterranean, generally at or near

of a Roman legion's auxiliary forces but was instead placed in

Italy.9 The existence of extensive fortifications also allowed

fortified areas to help with defense. 18 Luttwak suggests that

the mobile reserves to retreat behind high walls in the face

with the formation of wider ditches came the use of artillery

of defeat, and for intelligence to be gathered about enemy

to keep attackers away from the walls; with the attacking army

movements from the rear. III

stranded on the wrong side ofthe ditch ballistae and catapults

Because fortifications played such an important role

could rain fire down upon them at will. 19 Artillery, according

in the defense of the Roman Empire their improvement

to Luttwak's model. was designed to "hold the attackers in an

became mandatory as time went on. After the end of the

outer zone that could be covered by overlapping missile fire~

third century Roman forts began to take on characteristics

and "could not be sharply angled, [and] their fire could not be
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directed down at attackers close to the walls~
The final component of Luttwak's thesis that needs to

while the mobile reserve, mainly cavalry, could march to
meet them. Z7

be addressed is his depiction of Constantine's removal of

During the invasions ofShapur II Ammianus Mercellinus

provincial garrisons to supply a mobile Roman field army

recorded the military movements on the Eastern front at

that could come to the rescue of embattled garrisons in

the time, with particular regard to several fortified cities

~lt

is

apparent,~

he states, "that reductions made

and towns and the devastating effect Shapur's army had

in the provincial forces that guarded the frontiers in order

upon them. These descriptions of events also detail how

to strengthen the central field armies ... must inevitably

well the defense in depth model worked at the time. The

have downgraded the day-to-day security of the common

first town in his path was Singara, "abundantly fortified

people."ll Luttwak draws this conclusion that "Diocletian ...

with soldiers and with all necessities: a fact which seems to

created or expanded the sacer comitatus... , replacing the

contradict the idea of garrisons being fatally weakened by

improvised field forces of their predecessors with standing

the formation of a larger mobile reserve, at least in the minds

field armies and creating the dual structure of static border

of the Roman intelligentsia.'lS Upon the sighting of Shapur's

troops...and field forces ... that characterized the army of the

army, the defenders retreat inside Singara, but strangely "full

late empire: and that Constantine merely refined this method

of courage ran to the various towers and battlements and got

of defense.%! He goes on to say that the stationing of the

together stones and engines of war~lf In order for a defense

II Part/tica near Rome and the three Severan legions being

in depth model to be successful, the attacker needs to deal

commanded by the equestrian class made the foundation of

with a fortification, buying time for the mobile army to

the East.

this new "central field

army~

less of a military construction

counterattack. Yet it seems strange that Shapur II, fresh outof

and more of a political one. n This force was substantially

Persia with an enormous army, should attack the first heavily

increased by Constantine's time, with 23,000 men out of up

defended fortified town he sees, especially one defended

to 30,000 being ready for active campaigning, leaving only

valiantly by "townsmen.~JO The casualties were heavy on both

seven thousand for border defense.'U Constantine increased

sides. The town housed two of the smaller legions of the

the size of the field army, but as there were no new resources

time, the First Flavian and the First Parthian, yet "the greater

for the empire to draw from, it seems likely that these troops

part of the army was in camp guarding Nisibis, which was

were taken from provincial garrisons. 25 This leads Luttwak to

a very long distance off... [and] all the surrounding country

the aforementioned conclusion that the safety of the empire

was dried up from lack of water."JI This implies three things.

was drastically reduced because of troops being moved from

Firstly, should Shapur II have left the defenders of Singara

fortifications in the defense in depth model to stations within

behind him, it is unlikely that he would have to fear an attack

a mobile field army used primarily to keep the emperor in

in his rear, as it was guarded by a desolate wasteland where no

power and only secondarily as a military too!, a move for

water was to be found, thus eliminating one major advantage

which Luttwak feels Constantine is "rightly criticized"16. By

of the defense in depth model. Secondly, if the greater part

the time of Constantius, with which this paper is primarily

of the Roman army was at Nisibis, in light of the defense in

concerned, the defense in depth was so deep that only Italy

depth model it makes little sense for Shapur II to waste such

could rightly claim to be held, and then only because the

a significant part of his manpower taking a city that, as has

mobile reserve was deployed there; everything else was a

been said, posed little threat to his rear, while a much larger

network of fortifications designed to slow down the enemy

and more dangerous force was still in front of him. Finally,
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the Roman fortifications seem to have had little effect upon

his doubts, Ammianus doesn't specifically deny this rumor. 40

the Persian military. Ammianus claims that the Persian ram's

lending further suspicion of the effectiveness of Roman

effectiveness was largely due to its

~penetrating

the joints of

fortifications and the superiority of Persian siege engines.

the new laid stones, which were still moist and therefore

The ditches and double wall seem to have had little to no

W

weak where the city had been breached previously.» But

effect, and the Persian army, though doubtless exhausted

the first breach of the walls occurred in 348 C.E., and Shapur

from the long journey from Singara and anxious about

II's invasion was twelve years later; it seems unlikely, then,

the closing winter season 4l seems to have had tittle trouble

that the walls would still be so freshly made that a ram

rampaging unchecked through Roman territory; no mention

would have such an easy time of bringing them down. D This

of harassment tactics concerning the Persian supply lines is

lends credence to the idea that Shapur II's army had siege

made, and the mobile Roman army is conspicuously absent

equipment that Roman fortifications couldn't handle, either

from the proceedings. In the East, then, the Roman defense

because the fortifications were faulty themselves or the

in depth model seems so far to be a failure.

Persians had developed siege equipment superior to them,

With the death of Constantius Julian took the throne and

a theory that will be explored later following several other

in 363 C.E. invaded Persia with the mobile field army, only

primary source documents.

a few years since Shapur II's invasion of Roman territory

The next city to be attacked was Bezabde. a

~very

strong

in Mesopotamia. He assembled the army and "hastened

fortress" that was situated on a relatively large hill and

to invade the enemy's country, outstripping the report of

next to the banks of the Tigris river. 34 This fort had a wide

his coming."42 Upon the Roman army's arrival in Assyria

trench and a double wall where it was most vulnerable to

they confronted the Persian fortress of Anatha, captured it

assault by enemy siege engines and infantry.35 Bezabde was

through the Persian's surrender, and burned it to the ground

equipped with artillery as well, in lieu of its importance as

immediately afterwards. u

a military fortification. J6 The Persians do not seem to have

times, with several abandoned forts and a major fortress,

been deterred by the ditches, as their archers were able to

Pirisabora, all being captured and burned to the ground,

move close enough to the fortress to rain arrows down on

and their populace taken away as slaves.+! Maiozamalcha

the defenders as they prepared to repulse the attackers. 37

is also captured and destroyed 45 , and the capturing and

However, despite the close proximity of the archers, the

burning of fortifications and cities continues until Julian is

defending artillery wreaked havoc among the attacking forces

defeated at Ctesiphon.'16 The Chronicon Ps.-Dionysianum

regardless of their positioning. even driving off siege engines

says that, "Julian descended into Persia and devastated

38

the entire region from Nisibus as far as Ctesiphon in Bet

perilously close to the walls.

This goes against Luttwak's

This tactic is repeated several

there.~41

thesis that artillery was only useful when the enemy was

Aramaye. He took a large number of captives from

on the other side of the ditch or ditches surrounding the

Eutropius also mentions that "Several towns and fortresses

fort, and instead was effective against the enemy no matter

of the Persians he induced to surrender, and some he took by

where they were.

storm...

Again the Persians succeed in taking

[He laid] waste to Assyria."48 Julian's army and

Bezabde through the use of a ram, and again Ammianus

methods of attack were remembered in several places,

mentions extenuating circumstances, with a Christian priest

then, as being incredibly destructive and thorough;

supposedly conveying to Shapur Ii information concerning

nothing of any military or civilian value, it seems,

where the walls were weakest. 39 Though he claims to have

was left intact.
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At this point Julian and his army were deep inside Persian

Luttwak's thesis, then, with regard to the East, is not

territory. The role of Luttwak's mobile reserve army in the

fundamentally sound.

defense in depth model plays litlle part here. Instead of a

general cannot be said to have found Roman fortifications

reactionary tool designed to repel invaders and to secure the

intimidating, even when they were heavily improved,

embattled frontier zone, the mobile reserve instead takes

as in Bezabde.

the fight to the Persians, assaulting towns, cities, and forts

defensive emplacements, was not restricted to keeping the

with equal vigor in an effort to literally wipe out areas of

attackers beyond the defensive ditch found at many Roman

possible resistance. Soldiers and townsfolk are slaughtered

fortifications, but instead could and did fire upon attackers

or taken prisoner and sent west, and the forts themselves,

and siege equipment very dose to the walls. The mobile

rather than being saved for Roman use, are destroyed, to be

reserve was not mobile enough to support defense in depth

used by neither side. Luttwak's statement that Constantine

in the East. Shapur II invaded, sacked two cities, and nearly

is Mrightly criticized- for weakening border defenses seems

had time to annihilate a third, while Constantius mustered

amiss in light of Ammianus' histories. The townsfolk of

his troops.

Bezabde. Singara. and other perimeter fortresses seem to

success to an attacker having to annihilate fortifications,

have been able defenders, taking a heavy toll on Shapuc Irs

the Roman defense of Mesopotamia during Shapur II's

army, and the defense in depth model seems to dash with the

invasion can hardly be called successful. Likewise it seems

preferred method of Persian warfare. Rather than ignoring

fortifications behind Shapur II's lines had very little effect in

the fortified towns and smaller fortresses in his path. Shapur

terms of defensive strategy, as Ammianus' works seem to

systematically destroys all of them, just as the Romans did

suggest. And most importantly, the criticism of the mobile

when Julian invaded several years later. As Blockley puts it,

field army being increased at the diminishment of the border

Constantine's adoption of a major mobile reserve is not to

defenses seems to be entirely unfounded when the army

~an

Shapur II and Persia's armies in

Likewise artillery, though only used in

While a defense in depth model attributes

instrument

itself is regarded not merely as a military tool but also as

of a policy that was militarily and politically aggressive" his

a political and diplomatic one. While Luttwak's thesis has

strategy that of M
a harder counterstrike into enemy territory

many strong points, its overall defense brings to mind the

be criticized but instead should be seen as

as a prelude to a

settlement."~

Julian obviously used the

rotted walls of Singara. Several key elements are founded on

same basic strategy of destroying enemy assets in Persia to

faulty evidence which render the entire fortification, if you

assure compliance with Roman wishes, though the outcome

will, unsafe for defenders.

was not entirely favorable to the Romans in the end.so
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